Frames /sing


Understanding in a Flash and the Mastery of Technique

Eternity and Know-how
I’ve been reflecting on the concurrences between the excellent passage from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations below, and the Spinoza point made, which follows. Wittgenstein’s brilliant, economically, though quite gnomically put point has always been “there is no rule for how to follow a rule”. Simply so, when following a rule for action, the rule itself (nor the appeal to any other meta-rule) is not sufficient to justify the application of the rule, at least from any foundational conception of knowledge. In the passage below Wittgenstein picks up the simple mathematical example of rule-following, which he attempts to sculpt down to its most essential aspects. What is most telling is they way in which he rejects any temporal mental action/experience, what he calls a “mental process” as the source for what is called “understanding”. That is, anything that has what Spinoza named “duration” cannot be the origin of our ability to comprehend.
I’ve always looked at this passage with amazement, as we hear Wittgenstein’s mind ticking in self-conversation in his usual style, feeling a surgeon’s hands being placed right in the meat of what the much philosophically pursued “understanding” is. Never though had I connected the passage, either in influence or just in terms of content, to the similar analogy used by Spinoza to point out the difference between “rational” knowledge given by the appeal to reasons (the art of reasoning) and the preferred “intuitional” knowledge that comes out of a union with God, Substance, Nature.
Here is the respected passage from Wittgenstein. If you are not familiar with his method, keep track of the different Socratic voices:
145. Suppose the pupil now writes the series 0 to 9 to our satisfaction. – And this will only be the case when he is often successful, not if it does it right once in a hundred attempts. Now I continue the series and draw his attention to the recurrence of the first series in the units; and then to its recurrence in the tens. (Which only means that I use particular emphases, underline figures, write them one under another in such-and-such ways, and similar things.) – And now at some point he continues the series independently – or he does not.- But why do you say that? so much is obvious! – Of course; I only wish to say: the effect of any further explanation depends on reaction.
Now, however, let us suppose that after some efforts on the teacher’s part he continues the series correctly, that is, as we do it. So now we can say he has mastered the system. – But how far need he continue the series for us to have the right to say that? Clearly you cannot state a limit here.-
146. Suppose I now ask: “Has he understood the system when he continues the series to the hundredth place?” Or – if I should not speak of ‘understanding’ in connection with our primitive language-game: Has he got the system, if he continues the correctly so far? – Perhaps you will say here: to have got the system (or, again, to understand it) can’t consist in continuing the series up to this or that number: that is only applying one’s understanding. The understanding itself is a state which is the source of the correct use.
What is one really thinking of here? Isn’t one thinking of the derivation of a series from its algebraic formula? Or at least of something analogous? – But this is where we were before. The points is, we may think of more than one/ application of an algebraic formula; and any type of application may in turn be formulated algebraically; but naturally this does not get us any further.- The application is still a criterion of understanding.
147. “But how can this be? When I say I understand the rule of a series, I am surely not saying so because I have found out/ that up to now I had applied the algebraic formula in such-and-such a way! In my own case at all events I surely know that I mean such-and-such a series; it doesn’t matter how far I have actually developed it.” –
Your idea, then, is that you know the application of the rule of the series quite apart from remembering actual applications to particular numbers.  And you will perhaps say: “Of course! For the series is infinite and the bit of it that I can have developed finite.”
148. But what does this knowledge consist in? Let me ask: When do you know the application? Always? day and night? or only when you are actually thinking of the rule? do you know it, that is, in the same way as you know the alphabet and the multiplication table? Or is what you call “knowledge” a state of consciousness or a process – say a thought of something, or the like?
149. If one says that knowing the ABC is a state of the mind, one is thinking of a state of a mental apparatus (perhaps of the brain) by means of which we explain the manifestations/ of that knowledge. Such a state is called a disposition. But there are objections to speaking of a state of the mind here, inasmuch as there ought to be two different criteria for such a state: a knowledge of a the construction of the apparatus, quite apart from what it does. (Nothing would be more confusing here that to use the words “conscious” and “unconscious” for the contrast between states of consciousness and dispositions. For this pair covers up a grammatical difference.)
150. The grammar of the word “knows”  is evidently closely related to that of “can”, “is able to”. But also closely related to that of “understands”. (‘Mastery’ of a technique.)
Footnote, bottom of page 50: a) “Understanding a word” : a state. But a mental/ state? – Depression, excitement, pain, are called mental states. Carry out a grammatical investigation as follows: we say
“He was depressed the whole day.”
“He was in great excitement the whole day.”
“He has been in continuous pain since yesterday”.-
We also say “Since yesterday I have understood this word”. “Continuously”, though? – To be sure, one can speak of an interruption of understanding. But in what cases? Compare: “When did your pains get less?” and “When did you stop understanding that word?”
b) Suppose it were asked: When do you know how to play chess? All the time? or just while you are making a move? And the whole of chess during each move?- How queer that knowing how to play chess should take such a short time, and a game so much longer!
151. But there is also this use of the word “to know”: we say “Now I know!” – and similarly “Now I can do it!” and “Now I understand!”
Let us imagine the following example: A writes series of numbers down; B watches him and tries to find a law for the sequences of numbers. If he succeeds he exclaims: “Now I can go on!” – So this capacity, this understanding, is something that makes its appearance in a moment. So let us try and see what it is that makes its appearance here. – A has written down the numbers 1, 5, 11, 19, 29; at this point B says he knows how to go on. What happened here? Various things may have happened; for example, while A was slowly putting one number after another, B was occupied with trying various algebraic formulae on the numbers when had been written down. After A had written the number 19 B tried the formula a (subscript) n = n² + n -1; and the next number confirmed his hypothesis.
Or again, B does not think of formulae. He watches A writing his numbers down with a feeling of tension, and all sorts of vague thoughts go through his head. Finally he asks himself: “What is the series of differences?” He finds the series 4, 6, 8, 10 and says: Now I can go on.
Or he watches and says “Yes, I know that series” – and continues it, just as he would have done if A had written down the series 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, – Or he says nothing at all and simply continues the series. Perhaps he had what may be called the sensation “that’s easy!” (Such a sensation is, for example, that of a light quick intake of breath, as when one is slightly startled.)
152. But are the processes which I describe here understanding? “B understands the principle of the series” surely doesn’t mean simply: the formula “an =…” occurs to B. For it is perfectly imaginable that the formula should occur to him and that he should nevertheless not understand. “He understands” must have more in than: the formula occurs to him. And equally, more than any of those more or less characteristic accompaniments/ or manifestations of understanding.
153. We are trying to get a hold of the mental processes of understanding which seems to be hidden behind those coarser and therefore more readily visible accompaniments. But we do not succeed; or, rather, it does not get as far as a real attempt. For even supposing I had found something that happened in all those cases of understanding, – why should it be the understanding? And how can the process of understanding have been hidden, when I said “Now I understand” because I understood?! And if I say it is hidden – then how do I know what I have to look for? I am in a muddle.
154. But wait – if “Now I understand the principle” does not mean the same as “The formula…occurs to me” (or “I say the formula”, “I write it down”, etc.) – does it follow from this that I employ the sentence “Now I understand…” or “Now I can go on” as a description of a process occurring behind or side by side with that of saying the formula?
155. If there has to be anything ‘behind the utterance of the formula’ it is particular circumstances, which justify me in saying I can go on – when the formula occurs to me.
Try not to think of understanding as a ‘mental process’ at all. For that is the expression which confuses you. But ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say, “Now I know how to go on,” when, that is, the formula has occurred to me? –
In the sense in which there are processes (including mental processes) which are characteristic of understanding, understanding is not a mental process.
(A pain growing more or less; the hearing of a tune or a sentence: these are mental processes.)
156. Thus what I wanted to say was: when he suddenly knew how to go one, when he understood the principle, then possibly he had a special experience – and if he is asked: What was it? What took place when you suddenly grasped the principle?” perhaps he will describe it much as we described it above – but for us it is the circumstances/ under which he had such an experience that justified him in saying in such a case that he understands, that he knows how to go on.
Philosophical Investigations

There are several aspects of comparison between Wittgenstein and Spinoza, but most signficantly are Wittgenstein’s “nothing is hidden” assertion, as well as the notion that the learning of a rule is very much like the “mastery of a technique”. Evocatively he places “know” to be very close to the use of “can” or “is able to”, moving us very close Spinoza’s metaphysical point that knowing isn’t a representational state, but is an action.

Here are the related example from Spinoza’s Short Treatise, followed by the same example from two other works, concerning the ability to follow a rule:

Part II, Chapter I

Someone has merely heard someone else say that if, in the rule of three, you multiply the second and third numbers, and divide the product by the first, you then find the fourth number, which has the same proportion to the third as the second has to the first. And in spite of the fact that the one who told him this could be lying, he still governed his actions according to this rule, without having had any more knowledge of the rule of three than a blind man has of color. So whatever he may have been able to say about it, he repeated it, as a parrot repeats what it has been taught.
A second person, of quicker perception [more active intelligence, Shirley], is not content in this way with report, but tests it with some particular calculations, and finding that these agree with it, give his belief to it. But we have rightly said that this one too is subject to error. For how can he be sure that the experience of some particular [cases] can be a rule for him for all.
A third, being satisfied with neither with report, because it can deceive, nor with the experience of some particular [cases], because it cannot be a rule, consults true reason, which has never, when properly used, been deceptive. Reason tells him that because of the property of proportionality in these numbers, this is so, and coud not have been, or happened otherwise.
But a fourth, who has the clearest knowledge of all, has no need either of report, or of experience, or of the art of reasoning, because through his penetration he immediately sees the proportionality in all the calculations….
Chapter II
We call the first opinion because it is subject to error, and has no place in anything of which we are certain, but only where guessing and speculating are spoken of.
We call the second belief (opinion), because the things we grasp only through reason, we do not see, but know only through a conviction in the intellect that it must be so and not otherwise.
But we call that clear knowledge that comes not from being convinced by reasons, but from being aware of and enjoying the thing itself. This goes far beyond the others…
 the Short Treatise
…Suppose there are three numbers. Someone is seeking a fourth, which is to the third as the second is to the first. Here merchants will usually say that they know what to do to find the fourth number, because they have not yet forgotten that procedure which they heard from their teachers, without any demonstration.
Others will construct a universal axiom from an experience with simple numbers, where the fourth number is evident through itself – as in the numbers 2, 4, 3, and 6. Here they find by trial that if the second is multiplied by the third, and the product is divided by the first, the result is 6. Since they see that this produces the same number which they knew to be the proportional number withou this procedure, they infer that the procedure is always a good way to find the fourth number in the proportion.
But mathematicians know, by the force of the demonstration of Proposition 19 in Book VII of Euclid, which numbers are proportional to one another, from the nature of proportion, and its property, viz. that the product of the second and the third. Nevertheless, they do not see the adequate proportionality of the given numbers. And if they do, they see it not by the force of the Proposition, but intuitively, or without going through any procedure.
Emendation of the Intellect (23)
…Given the numbers 1, 2 and 3, no one fails to see that the fourth proportional number is 6 – and we see this much more clearly because we infer the fourth number from the ratio which, in one glance, we see the first number to have the second.
Ethics, IIp40s2iv
Tool Use and Eternity
After all this quotation I want to create the picture that for both Spinoza and Wittgenstein the rules of reason were to be seen as tools (and not knowledge in their own right), techniques of action. What both thinkers shared was a engineer’s sensitivity towards the way that parts fit together. Spinoza of course was a master lens-craftsman and Wittgenstein an amateur architect and mechanical engineer (I believe he designed his own aircraft engine, if I recall correctly). What is most germane, as both thinkers reflect back upon each other, is I think the way in which Wittgenstein’s “circumstances” which act as the criteria for our justification of the rule-following of others, opens out the historical immanence for Spinoza’s view towards eternity. This is to say, or argumentation about the truths of actions find their criteria in the real, historical milieu to which they are immanent. I think that this is very much in keeping with Spinoza’s articulation (as long as we remain under the question of “justification”). In this sense, reason has a historically contingent, natura naturata manifestation and horizon. But as well, Spinoza’s window unto eternity, aside from the question of justification, makes more clear Wittgenstein’s own attachment to a denial of durative processes as the source of understanding. Instead, while historically contingent criteria, all immanent to their circumstances, may lead us to the intuitive grasp of wholes, these are mere tools in a certain, transpiercing of history through intuitive grasp (in which the issue of justification falls away). Ultimately these are human and abiotic bindings, constitutive of their mutuality, in the end causal relations of perception. In all perceptions, including those of animals and inanimate objects, nothing is hidden, nothing lies beyond.
I think that this goes onto explain Spinoza’s own reticence towards the technological innovations of Christiaan Huygens in the area of lens grinding. Huygens and his brother were brilliant experimenters with the art of lens grinding, an area of craft which Spinoza specialized in. What is of note is that Spinoza did not find the Huygens’ shiny devices of much interest, just the sorts of machines that were arriving on the scene which seemed to manifest cleanly the powers of mathematical knowledge itself. Mechanical instruments seemed to express abstract truths without the stain of human hand. But Spinoza found this the least bit interesting:

The said Huygens has been a totally occupied man, and so he is, with polishing glass dioptrics; to that end a workshop he has outfitted, and in it he is able to “turn” pans – as is said, it’s certainly polished – what tho’ thusly he will have accomplished I don’t know, nor, to admit a truth, strongly do I desire to know. For me, as is said, experience has taught that with spherical pans, being polished by a free hand is safer and better than any machine. 

Spinoza in his letter to Oldenburg refers actually to the supposedly lowest level of knowledge in his trinity, experience, as the reproof of the importance of the semi-automated machine that he saw. I don’t believe that this is a small dispositional point. Rather, just as Wittgenstein refuses any grounding of “understanding” in rules (which are tools), and as Spinoza puts “intuitional knowledge” above the truths found in the Art of Reasoning, I believe that Spinoza found the appeal of instruments themselves as abstract devices and powers (be they rules, theorems, machines) to be utterly secondary to the intuitional revelation of God and Nature itself, through those tools. His preference for the “free hand” over the automated gear turn, expressed above, is not simply a pragmatic issue (most of Huygens devices did not seem to produce usable lenses), but also a question of just what the human/technological interface involved, and the powers of its action. Instrumentality, like that would mark much of scientific pursuit, was a fetish. Maths and Science were tools used for the transformational intuition of truth, a strong de-centering of the subject, and were not truths about the world themselves.

18 responses to “Understanding in a Flash and the Mastery of Technique

  1. Asher Kay October 27, 2009 at 1:13 am

    There were about a hundred times while I was reading “Philosophical Investigations” that I strongly desired to go back in time and show Wittgenstein how neural networks work. Never was that feeling stronger than when I read the passage you quote above.

    In a way, the idea of intuition as “a union with God, Substance, Nature” is not too different from the idea of a rule as learned by a neural network. The structure, or “truth” of the rule has to be out there, and the learning is a restructuring that happens right at the interface of the brain and the external structure – right where we overlap with the world – and it’s in a place that we don’t have conscious access to.

    In the neural network, you can see restructuring, and you can see the change in output that indicates that the rule is being “followed”, but there’s nothing you can see that has the “form” of the rule.

    • kvond October 27, 2009 at 12:22 pm

      I hate saying this because there are those that when they say this accept no criticism of Wittgenstein, but I think you are missing Wittgenstein’s point. His point is difficult to track sometimes. He is interested in the question of justification, in particular, he is trying to show that justification requires criteria (which are reasons given). The larger relationship that you describe is a different process, that of causes. This is a fundamental distinction in Wittgenstein, one which he is at extreme pains to keep apart, and indeed it is a fundamental problem in philosophy (for instance in Kant the categories conflatedly work as both causes and reasons, in Davidson beliefs work as both causes and reasons).

      I agree with you on Neural Networks, and I suspect that Wittgenstein would as well (perhaps even Spinoza). The question is, “where” is the “understanding” itself, (which in your example is: Where is the source of the reconfiguration itself, the ability to adapt?) and in Wittgenstein the “where” is exposed as the wrong kind of question (he gives clue to this in stating that “know” is grammatically related to “can”). Its like asking “where” or “what” is the “can-ness”?

      To put it another way, the only reason why we can say that “a rule is being followed” by a neural network is because we take in the actions of the network, and the conditions of the world, we set up criteria, and come to agreement that a rule has been followed (just as when the pupil writes out the series). It is in the “circumstances” that this process of justification occurs. In Davidson this is known as triangulation.

      Spinoza agrees with you that the “union with God” is that the structure is “out there”. The common notions (ideas) that join things acts causally upon the “mind” (the ideational organization of something, what I would call its “information”), and CAUSES it to have a “perception” that is intuitional. But importantly this is outside the realm of reason giving. It is simply a direct perception, ie. nothing is hidden. The way that Spinoza reads it this is an essential causal relation which allows anything to DO anything (even to persist). But one does not justify this relation.

      Instead, the question of reasons simply serve as a tool to further enhance this causal relation.

  2. Asher Kay October 27, 2009 at 12:41 pm

    No, I do get what Wittgenstein was doing — his rejection of “temporal action” is in almost precise opposition to what I was saying. But I think that, presented with how neural networks operate in applying rules, he may have reconsidered his take on process — and not just because a rule “disappears” when looking at it through the perspective of a neural network.

    For one thing, questions like, “When do you know the application? Always? day and night? or only when you are actually thinking of the rule?” have a real and simple answer in terms of neural networks. The structure that will produce the application is always there, and the application happens when the input is pushed through.

    But in a deeper sort of way, it gets at his distinction between “process” and “circumstance”. In terms of neural networks, “circumstance” is the structure of the network (not just the connections, of course, but also how the connections *will* interact). And “process” is the activation of the network. Wittgenstein may not have ever agreed that process and circumstance are inextricably meshed, but I can’t help but wonder what he would have made of that perspective.

  3. kvond October 27, 2009 at 12:42 pm

    AK: Consider Davidson’s description of criteria and creature behavior here:

    upper paragraph on the left (p. 212)

  4. Asher Kay October 27, 2009 at 12:43 pm

    Oh, but I forgot to say that you’re right — I’m sort of side-stepping the “justification” part, which is essential for W.

    • kvond October 27, 2009 at 12:57 pm

      When you side step this question of justification you are missing his point, because THAT is his point.

      For instance: “For one thing, questions like, “When do you know the application? Always? day and night? or only when you are actually thinking of the rule?” have a real and simple answer in terms of neural networks. The structure that will produce the application is always there, and the application happens when the input is pushed through.”

      These questions are not to be “answered” but are rather exposed as nonsensical. One must always produce the circumstances and the criteria if one is to get at the question of the justification of whether someone (or someTHING) understands or not. Even in the case of a neural network you cannot simply point to the network itself and say “there…right there is “understands”!” Understands goes outside of itself, into a relation which is ultimately causal (not found in reasons, nor in the rules themselves). This is his point, at least as far as I read it.

      It is because he is specifically critcizing the aims of philosophy you have to keep track of the question of justification.

      • Asher Kay October 27, 2009 at 1:16 pm

        Yes, true. What I’m saying is that I think Wittgenstein may have reconsidered his take on justification, since NNs provide an answer of a particular sort, but still support his position on the question – as it is posed – being nonsensical (because of the fact that the “answer” shows that you can’t ostensively point at a rule, or at “understands”). I think a framework like that would have allowed Wittgenstein to expand further beyond language, if that makes any sense.

        I admit, though, that I read Wittgenstein in a weird way. A lot of philosophers who mention Wittgenstein focus on his rejection of certain questions as nonsensical, but the stuff in Philosophical Investigations is really hard for me to read as Socratic, in the sense of leading the reader toward a conclusion. I see Wittgenstein asking whether the questions are nonsensical, but still preoccupied with the questions; still formulating and reformulating them.

      • kvond October 27, 2009 at 1:31 pm

        When I called W’s style Socratic, I’m not sure that I meant that it is designed to lead the reader to a conclusion. I think Wittgensteinians make far too much of this supposed “conclusion”. Just as the “understanding” is not found in a rule, the conclusion is not found in something he says. Its more open-ended (and I think in the actual case of Socrates the person, probably so as well).

        I agree that Wittgenstein is not simply dismissing certain questions, but more its like turning them over in his hand, feeling their edges (hence his appeal to the “grammatical”). But I’m not sure that NNs answer the particular things he is addressing.

  5. Asher Kay October 27, 2009 at 1:00 pm

    Re Davidson: From my perspective, he is painting with a really broad brush. In terms of a neural network (I’m just going to say NN), the criterion for similarity is in the way the thing operates. I basically agree with him that the responses of an observer are required, but I think that if we could look at the NN directly (things like fMRIs are instruments too blunt to do that), we could see the criteria (the causality involved in something being considered similar) in action. The correlation between what the observer sees in the NN and what the observer takes note of in the subject’s world is still there.

    But maybe that doesn’t have anything to do with what you were trying to point out.

    As a side note, whoever owns that copy of Davidson really knows how to abuse a book.

    • kvond October 27, 2009 at 1:10 pm

      AK: but I think that if we could look at the NN directly (things like fMRIs are instruments too blunt to do that), we could see the criteria (the causality involved in something being considered similar) in action. The correlation between what the observer sees in the NN and what the observer takes note of in the subject’s world is still there.

      Kvond: Sure, but the “understanding” is not “there” in the neural network, it is, at least its justification, in the composite of a triangulation, which cannot be broken.

      • Asher Kay October 27, 2009 at 1:21 pm

        That’s precisely the beauty of the NN perspective (or I guess, the “emergence” perspective) — we can suss out the causality, and that gives us an understanding of why we will never be able to point to a “there”, even when we know all of the causality involved (which may never happen), and even when we know that there’s nothing magical going on outside of the structure and the causality.

      • kvond October 27, 2009 at 1:27 pm

        What is “magical” is that even our brute description of the causal powers of the network is not sufficient to account for the entire “circumstance” which allows us to say it “understands”, a circumstance which forcibly includes our own observation, and the states of the world. It is ever the turn towards a wholism of answers. That which cannot be explained by sheer reference.

    • kvond October 27, 2009 at 1:12 pm

      p.s. I never thought I would be posting that essay. Its hilarious how much I marked up those pages, and banged that copy around. I posted it because, at least at the time, there was no copy of this important essay on the internet. Its really a wonderful essay.

  6. kvond October 27, 2009 at 1:05 pm

    AK: “But in a deeper sort of way, it gets at his distinction between “process” and “circumstance”. In terms of neural networks, “circumstance” is the structure of the network (not just the connections, of course, but also how the connections *will* interact). And “process” is the activation of the network. Wittgenstein may not have ever agreed that process and circumstance are inextricably meshed, but I can’t help but wonder what he would have made of that perspective.”

    Kvond: Pay attention to what exactly he uses as an example of a mental process, and the question of “duration”. He says a “pain” is a mental process, or a depression, or a sudden feeling of insight. These are things that begin at a certain moment in time, and then fade away. When he says the understanding is not found in these mental processes, he is saying it is not temporal, not phenomenal, like the hearing of a note. Its not something that comes before the mind, so to speak. Instead, it goes outside of itself, to include the circumstances. This actually is right on point of what you are trying to say as well.

  7. duncan October 29, 2009 at 4:07 pm

    Kvond – this is beside the point of the thread, but I’ve for a long time been curious about the relation between Wittgenstein’s discussion of rule-following, and the First Critique‘s Schematism. I’ve never had the time or – I guess – the inclination to pursue it. But since we I think know that Wittgenstein read at least the First Critique with reasonable care, it strikes me as something in principle worthy of pursuit. (Perhaps others have done this.) Here are some of the relevant passages from Kant:

    But pure concepts of understanding being quite heterogeneous from empirical intuitions, and indeed from all sensible intuitions, can never be met with in any intuition. For no one will say that a category, such as that of causality, can be intuited through sense and is itself contained in appearance. How, then, is the subsumption of intuitions under pure concepts, the application of a category to appearances, possible?

    No image could ever be adequate to the concept of a triangle in general. It would never attain that universality of the concept which renders it valid of all triangles, whether right-angled, obtuse-angled, or acute- angled; it would always be limited to a part only of this sphere. The schema of the triangle can exist nowhere but in thought. It is a rule of synthesis of the imagination, in respect to pure figures in space. Still less is an object of experience or its image ever adequate to the empirical concept; for this latter always stands in immediate relation to the schema of imagination, as a rule for the determination of our intuition, in accordance with some specific universal concept. The concept ‘dog’ signifies a rule according to which my imagination can delineate the figure of a four-footed animal in a general manner, without limitation to any single determinate figure such as experience, or any possible image that I can represent in concreto, actually presents. This schematism of our understanding, in its application to appearances and their mere form, is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze.

    It seems to me that this “art concealed in the depths of the human soul,” is close to the thing that Wittgenstein has in mind, in his discussions of rule-following. I wondered if you had any thoughts on this? Or on the relation between that passage in Kant, and the passage you quote from Spinoza.

  8. Tim Thornton October 30, 2009 at 12:51 pm

    On that connection may I recommend a fine paper by David Bell:
    Bell, D. (1987) `The art of judgment’ Mind 96: 221-44

    If you’re interested (in the subject) I wrote a paper on this which you can find here:

  9. duncan October 31, 2009 at 9:30 am

    Thank you both – Tim, those papers look really interesting and on point. (Not read them yet, but today I hope!) Kvond, would be very interested to know your thoughts as and when.


  10. Shaikh Waheeduddin November 3, 2009 at 1:04 pm

    very nice information I am impressed
    keep up good work

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