Frames /sing


From Ideal Networks to Real Ones: Al Qaeda and Chaoplexic Warfare

Are Networks Networks?

One of the weaknesses of a Latourian sense of the world as Networking is that though such sociological analytic takes its traction from the fashion in which actual networks have been coming to dominate our communications and industry, it is not really the Internet or other literal networks Latour and ANTS are talking about. Indeed, everything is to be explained by the transformations of networks, and it may be that literal networks are some of the things that are least explainable in such terms. Which is to say that the dispositions of any of the actants and their various trials of strength really are not the best, or at least the most compelling causal narratives by which we should come to understand them. For while it does something to undress prima facie non-network social phenomena such as Scientific discovery so as to reveal their networked, actant natures, something else seems to occur when we consider networks themselves, things that don’t nearly have to be demystified to such a degree. In the past I have argued that Latour is in need of a Spinozist rationality of cause (here, here and here), but Latour is not so much the aim here as the context for an interesting historical example which gives me pause to ANTism.

The source of my series of thoughts is The Scientific Way of Warfare by Antoine Bousquet. I got the title from Nick at Accursed Share. I can say that he does a much better job then I ever would in reviewing the book. Instead I would like to take a very small snippet from the quite interesting analysis which attempts to expose the conceptual schema of modern warfare organization, as exemplified or inspired by the four devices: clock, engine, computer, network. Really the first two are only cursorily handled without much historical depth, providing only conceptual framework for the latter two of which the author has the most knowledge and interest.

What Antoine Bousquet contends is that with the advent of the computer military organization took on a largely cybernetic concern of command and control. Under this command and control approach, like a computer, military action was thought of as a closed organization whose interrelatability of parts had to be perfected in terms of information processing so as to best rule out informational “noise” from the environment. And this closed-circuit organization is achieved through negative feedback, the steering of the closed system away from events that disturbed its homeostasis. Bousquet thus suggests that historically with the rise of real networks in the world – principally the Internet which began as a military program that become civilized – coupled to the increased applicability of Chaos Theory and Complexity Theory, decentralized organization was discovered to be far more resilient and adaptable than the Closed System. Decentralized modeling followed Positive Feedback instead of the computer model’s Negative Feeback, and became the new paradigm for vital military and security organization. As he traces it, this paradigm has been adopted by the United States military to only a limited degree, as hierarchical, topsight priorities have used growing network connections for increasedly centralized control, in a kind of culturally entrenched conceptual backlash.

Deviations From Homeostasis

Rather, the better example of military chaoplexic warfare seems to be that of al Qaeda, the description of which I will quote at length:

Since September 11, the focus has naturally been on al-Qaeda and the wider movement of radical Islamist militancy and terrorism. The nebulous and dispersed nature of these organizations has invited their analysis in terms of decentered networks and complex adaptive systems. Thus al-Qaeda is seen as a decentralized and polymorphous network “with recursive operational and financial interrelationships dispersed geographically across numerous associated terrorist organizations that adapt, couple and aggregate in pursuit of common interests” [citing “Observing Al Qaeda Through the Lens of Complexity Theory: Recommendations for the National Strategy to Defeat Terrorism,” Beech]. For Marion and Uhl-Bien, interactive non-linear bottom-up dynamics are behind the self-organization of al-Qaeda in which bin Laden and the al-Qaeda leadership are an emergent phenomena: “leaders do not create the system but rather are created by it, through a process of aggregation and emergence” [citing “Complexity Theory and Al-Qaeda: Examining Complex Leadership,” Marion and Uhl-Bien].While a diffuse movement of Islamic radicalism coalesced to create terrorist networks from which the leadership could spring, the latter has also assisted the continued development of a decentralized movement by maintaining and fostering “a moderately coupled network, but one possessing internal structures that were loosely and tightly organized as appropriate.” The authors distinguish between loosely coupled networks in which the parts have functional independence, thus granting the system great resilience to large scale perturbations, and tightly coupled networks in which the leadership imposes control mechanisms that enable it to direct activities and receive regular reports. In between these two poles, we find moderately coupled networks which allow some degree of directing by leadership but retain great resiliency. [note the rhetorical disbalance here: modest “some” vs. the still threatening “great”]. If the wider radical Islamist movement is only loosely coupled and individual terrorist cells are tightly coupled, the pre-9/11 al-Qaeda leadership network sat somewhere in between, performing the function of a galvanized interface.

Even in the case of [a] single operation such as September 11, it has become increasingly clear that its planning and execution were far more decentralized than initially supposed. The different cells in the plot, although tightly coupled internally, functioned quasi-autonomously, and although they received some financial, logistical and training support from other parts of the organisation, were not exclusively dependent on them. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, said to be the operational “mastermind” behind September 11 (a designation which, although commonly used in the media, is problematic as it suggests highly centralized planning and control) and now in American military custody, is alleged to have claimed that “the final decisions to hit which target with which plane was entirely in the hands of the pilots.” Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was only then subsequently informed of their decision in July 2001. According to this same testimony, bin Laden and the high ranks of the al-Qaeda organisation were only loosely informed of specific details and had only a very limited directing role. Many of bin Laden’s close associates were never even made aware of the plot. This form of organisational and operational structure is one that is particularly alien to Western states and their heirarchial military and security apparatuses, as Mohammed himself recognises, “I know that the materialistic western mind cannot grasp the idea, and it is difficult for them to believe that the high officials in al-Qaeda do not know about operations carried out by its operatives, but this is how it works.”

The Scientific Way of Warfare, 208-209

And here are three worthy quotes explaining how complex organization is to be thought of…

Complex adaptive systems constitute a special case of complex systems that are capable of changing and learning from experience. Complexity theorist John Holland defines a complex adaptive system as a dynamic network of many agents acting in parallel, constantly acting and reacting to what the other agents are doing. Since the control of a complex adaptive system tends to be highly dispersed and decentralized, any coherent behavior in the system arises from competition and cooperation among the agents themselves. It is the accumulation of all the individual decisions taken by the multitude of agents which produces the overall behavior of the system, which can thus be said to be emergent. (175)

The worldview constituted by chaoplexity marks a seismic shift away from the dominant conceptions of the natural world. No longer is order to be seen a product of the natural tendency towards equilibrium. On the contrary, it is with non-equalibrium that order emerges from chaos, at the point where instability and creative mutation allow for the genesis of new forms and actions. Consequently, the systems produced through these processes of self-organisation have distinct emergent features which cannot be understood solely through an analysis of their atomized components since it is their pattern of interaction which constitute their complexity. (181)

“Up to a point, tightening the connections between elements in the system will increase efficiency when everything works smoothly. But, if one small item goes wrong, then that can have a catastrophic knock-on effect throughout the system. The system literally switches over, from smooth functioning to interactively complex disaster”

Global Complexity, Urry

We can see the beauty of this particular kind of networked conception one which Bousquet reads as perched between order (systematic, heirarchial, negative feedback restrictive control) and chaos. A non-equilibrium juxtaposition that uses its very instability as an advantage of its own becoming. And indeed there is something of a parallel to philosophies of becoming that want to read things in terms of primary deterrorializations. When one considers something like Latour’s notion of actants in network somehow the critical analogy which seems to hide within many of our non-network seeming processes don’t really seem to explain what is happening, or how information and organization is acquired in al Qaeda:

in order to spread far…. an actant needs faithful allies who accept what they are told, identify itself with its cause, carry out all the functions that are defined for them, and come to its aid without hesitation when they are summoned. The search for these ideal allies occupies the space and time of those who wish to be stronger than others. As soon as an actor has found a somewhat more faithful ally, it can force another ally to become more faithful in its turn. “despite everything, networks reinforce one another and resist destruction. Solid yet fragile, isolated yet interwoven, smooth yet twisted together, [they] form strange fabrics.” (199)

The Pasturization of France

Beds of Chaoplexic Organization

It is not enough to say that bin Laden has performed a trial of strength and created allies, or that each of the cell groups have identified with his cause, and then carry out “the functions”. There is something more going on here. It is true that networks such as al Qaeda are resilient and reinforced (though their persistent media image as THE threat no doubt goes a long way in preserving and overstating this); yet this is not just a story of alliances. As Bousquet tells it, it is a story of patterns. It is the very distinct pre-Chaotic level of al Qaeda organization that the figure of its strength lies, such that it cannot be either predicted (only perturbed), nor destroyed (only fragmented). One suspects rather strongly that it is not even in the pattern itself that the whole causal story is told, but as well in the ideological substrate, the entire imaginary, affective pool of Middle Eastern, and indeed global Islamic realities, as well as very concrete political-economic stratifications, which serve as immanent possibility for such a Chaoplexic organization. It is not just that they are braided into alliances, but also that the ideological well-spring is rich enough that fragmentation does not kill operation.

In this way the initial conditions prove significant sources for the possibilities of Chaoplexic collectivity, whole-cloth ideational dispositions that work as a body upon which organization can express itself so as to arise with emergent (and fluctuating) powers of action. There is something more than actants and their transformations.

In this way ideology and economy serve as a kind of perspective intermediate stage between full-blown metaphysics (which once only had the State as its avatar), a pseudo-divinity of effects which is neither object (actant) or its relationships (network). Not a material plasma, but an affective/conceptual coherence between bodies that readies actants for a change in the degree of order/chaos ratios, hence adaptive intelligence. In a sense, al Qaeda structures exhibit the very radicality of democracy itself, perhaps governed (made possible via Negative feedback) as it is by other significant anti-Western cultural factors.

Addendum: Here is a interesting, well-summed blogged review by Chet Richards, over at Defense and the National Interest, an electronic source even cited by Bousquet, with mention of Boyd’s OODA loops which is perhaps the most compelling aspect of the book, something I hope to post on soon. Included in the review is link to the influential essay by Linda Beckerman “The Non-Linear Dynamics of War” (1999), also cited by Bousquet.

31 responses to “From Ideal Networks to Real Ones: Al Qaeda and Chaoplexic Warfare

    • kvond August 22, 2009 at 12:37 pm

      Thanks Eric, its wonder I could not find it. Even Google under the “blog” subcategory wouldn’t yeild it. Correction to source made.

  1. Eric August 22, 2009 at 12:43 pm

    So in simple Spinozan terms, ANT takes the actant (and its relations within the network) as the locus of power, while ignoring the power of the imagination (ideology) and ultimately of the affects. Is this how you see it?

    But, how are concrete political stratifications seperate from networks?

    I don’t know much about ANT, so I guess I better read Latour’s ‘On Network Theory: a few clarifications’. I also look forward to reading your other Latour/Spinoza posts.

    (I apologize for posting this comment already in another post)

    • kvond August 22, 2009 at 2:21 pm

      There are several answers here. There is the one that Bousquet offers which is that it is the pattern itself which produces the chaoplexic relation. One, if one really wanted to push certain categories, claim that this edge-of-chaos pattern is the network, but it seems that we loose something of a power of a description, because a “network” for Latour is simply a trial of strength of interdependent re-alliances. Clearly here a chaoplexic relation is something more than merely this.

      Secondly though, the very resilience of the supposed network here, the way that fragmentation does not destroy the combinative relations, speaks to other causal factors which for me include a certain body of affects, imaginary relations and historical facts spread across domains. If indeed a statement of mission such as:

      “to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate al-Aqsa Mosque and the Holy Mosque (Mecca) from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.” (World Islamic Front Statement, 1998).

      …is to have lasting organizational abilities, it seems to me that there are wide-spread circumstances of loose potential affinities that allow the idea of such resistance to spread and maintain itself. It is not to say that the capacity of the network is reduced to such a potentiality, but rather also, it cannot be reduced to merely the trail-of-strength of bin Laden himself, as actant, and a resultant array of related alliances and trials. In a certain sense, the ANT hill, and the earth itself is missing from the ANTS.

      As to whether concrete political stratifications are networks, they certainly can yield to network descriptions, in the sense that ANT theory thinks EVERYTHING can yield to such. But what is more interesting is the way in which these stratifications extend across domains in such a way that Actants are not so atomized. Let us take for instance the idea that with Capitalized conceptions of free choice in the market, and the identities that purchase-power forms, DID NOT come democratic forms of governance to approximate this, let’s say Western notion of subject. Here we have a swathe of real, historical differentials across nations that is best not seen as merely alliances between actants. Instead, imaginary relations help constitute the very disparity and potentiality that produces chaoplexic network capacities, or so it seems.

  2. Eric August 22, 2009 at 5:06 pm

    Yes, so the common cultural/historical and affective ‘background’ of the actants plays a role in the recursivity of there actions. It is not just the endeavour towards a common cause, or the pattern of organization, or the information in the system which causes the actants to make alliances. So is Spinoza, then a really a theorist of the network at all? Perhaps only in the broadest sense, in that all things are expressions of one and the same substance?

  3. kvond August 22, 2009 at 5:38 pm

    Eric: “So is Spinoza, then a really a theorist of the network at all?”

    Kvond: Well, this is the thing. If you consider Latour a theoriest of the network, Spinoza is, as I tried to express in my post on Spinoza and Latour. All of Latour fits nicely within Spinoza, like a Russian Doll, there is more to the story.

    The primary connection between Spinoza and Latour is that actants can be regarded as Spinosist “bodies”, of which anything and everything is composed, in relations. Trials of strength are for Spinoza not unexplained happenstance of contingent victories. Yes, there are contingent clashes and evolutions, but also there are rational, ideational advantages between actants. And moving from imaginary relations to causal ones involves genuine changes in power. One can never be completely rational, or even primarily rational, but rationality is primarily a process of body building. Processes of agreement, whether they be of imaginary or rational basis, are the productions of “bodies”, and hence networks. A network is a body.

    But if you mean “network” as Bousquet means it, an edge of chaos organization, this is a very interesting question, and one which I wish I had time to pursue. There are aspects of Spinoza which are closely related to the “closed organization” of cybernetic, computational model (and Autopoiesis on the biological side) which Bousquet argues preceded the Network historically. Much of his advice is towards the internally directed clarification of relations, gaining clearer ideas, etc. But one can also see that if indeed such system thinking is negative feedback oriented (the steering towards homeostasis), there are also distinguished ways in which Spinoza favors the Postitive Feedback, edge of chaos thinkings that mark out Networks. Any of our internal system, closed model improvements only work because they are joined already to what is external, and ultimately it is “Love” and “Joy” which as a positive feedback accelerator which leads us to combine with other bodies in more fruitful ways. What he seems to prescribe is a combination of Positive and Negative feedback loops which, as Bousquet cites may indeed describe the biology of adaptive evolution, such that positive accelerations are then contrained by a sobriety of internal redistribution, or what is commonly called “learning”. In this sense, at least off the top of my head, it would seem that Spinoza indeed is a theorist of the Network in the more literal sense, the production of real, edge of chaos relations as a mode of body building and freedom making.

  4. Eric August 22, 2009 at 6:32 pm

    Sorry if my timing is off, I have been away from the computer off and on constantly today.

    I meant “network” in the edge-of-chaos sense and you nailed it for me.

    It is very interesting to think about these moments in the evolution of ideas (and there counterparts in warfare, business, biologiy, etc.)and see if Spinoza isn’t extremely helpful in their guidance.

    • kvond August 22, 2009 at 6:43 pm

      What is interesting about applying Bousquet’s four stage historical development is that Descartes was determinatively a clock-work thinker (perhaps not entirely so, as he also seems to have a strong naturalized, semiotic strain of thought as well…it was this semiosis that I believe that Spinoza took up). Automata fascinated Descartes. Christiaan Huygens Spinoza’s associate and neighbor actually invented the pendulum clock. Spinoza embraces this automata in a a certain way, as for instance he calls us all “spiritual automata” but it is not so much parts put into closed mechanistic relation. So the question is, to what degree does Spinoza represent a departure from the “clock-work” of 17th century Dutch thinking?

      What is very interesting to me is the way that Spinoza relates to the closed systems of cybernetics, which are a kind of second-wave clock-work thinking. Autopoiesis perhaps the best point of comparision, as it attempts to model life itself on closed organizational models. I have not thought it through, but as I suggested in my respose, there is a sense in which Spinoza speaks of both the closed and the open aspects of social organization. I wish I could say/think more on this.

  5. anodyne lite August 22, 2009 at 6:47 pm

    I can see how choaplexity is latent in ‘nomadology’, and the network in ‘the rhizome’… I wonder if Guattari gets much attention from ANtheorists. Probably not.

    • kvond August 22, 2009 at 6:53 pm

      I saw this too, as chaoplexity in many of the description of the books is essentially a theory of “becoming”, just the kind of thing that G and D love to favor. There seem like two modes of descrption here. One is that chaoplexity is a careful balance between extremes of stagnant order, and turbulant chaos, such that there is a kind of positive feedback pursuit of this line of balance, as if surfing a wave, trying to stay in the tube so to speak. This seems very much in keeping with the G and D praxix and prescription.

      But then there is also the sense of oscillation, that is, instead of precarious balance wherein one never really dips into either order or chaos, but that balance itself is composed of alternate phasal passings into one and then the other, which is perhaps even more interesting.

      The nomadology seems to be more of the first kind, the pursuit of a kind of aesthetic ideal, Whereas the second kind might be even more descriptively significant.

  6. Eric August 22, 2009 at 7:02 pm

    I haven’t read the book or much of anything relavant so I don’t have anything to add. But I very much look forward to any more posts down this avenue of thought. The Bousquet book is very high on my to read list, because it really looks right down my alley. The clockmindedness of the 17th century, and what Spinoza may have replaced this model with, is a very intriguing thing for me, thank you for bringing that to my attention. By the way, you critique of Heidegger in the post about how he misconstrued the word ‘aletheia’ was extremely helpful for me.

    • kvond August 22, 2009 at 7:19 pm

      I’m glad to have positive feedback on the Heidegger post, as I’ve only has harsh reactions from Heideggerians thus far. How Heidegger viewed and interpreted Greek texts is a very important point.

      When you do read the Bousquet book do let me know any thoughts that arise. The first two device headings, clock and engine were pretty disappointing for me, so if it bogs down for you, press onto the last two which are much more full-fleshed.

  7. Eric August 22, 2009 at 11:12 pm

    Thanks for the warning. I will stick to it and return back here with comments.

    • kvond August 22, 2009 at 11:15 pm

      When you said that this is “right up your alley” I’m not sure what alley you meant, “warfare” or “complexity” or some other thing. But you might want to check out the addendum I put at the end of my post, which cites a Nation Defense blog which has several articles in this genre, including a review of the book, and an article which I link. Hopefully some of this is of interest for you as well.

  8. Eric August 23, 2009 at 9:21 am

    Ooh, yes the OODA loops is something that I have thought about often. Thanks, for the link. I am interested in structures in warfare, as you know, these forms of organization leak into bureaucracies,technology, science then all the way into daily life. Why is it that these structural changes appear first in warfare? Something I have yet to really grasp. Well, they actually originate with philosophers don’t they, but war is were they have been most significantly cashed out it seems, first.

    • kvond August 23, 2009 at 12:59 pm

      Ah good. Then you can perhaps offer some help in response, as I’m hoping to post on OODA loops soon. Bousquet devotes a sub-chapter to it, and for some reason it really took to my imagination. But there seems very little written on it in the sense that I am thinking about it, it seems (and very little written at all). We’ll see what I can come up with.

      As to the military being the first with these things, I don’t know if that is historically true. But as many of these organizational features come straight out of technological invention and deploy, (Bousquet does a very good job with this in terms of the computer), and as the military has both the pressure of an arm’s race and a great deal of money to be spent, it makes very good sense that at least recently organizational changes are going to happen there. You loose a war and there have to be changes.

  9. Eric August 23, 2009 at 6:09 pm

    well, isn’t te OODA loop a provide a good model for our judgments of things?
    We observe (our interaction with the environment unfolding), we orient (genealogy, previous experience, beliefs, cultural environment) we decide (if we are thinking rationally then we have the option of disbelief) and then we cash out these decisions in our actions. This is one way in which the OODA loop strikes me as useful. Somewhere along the line, we are fed back a glimpse of intuition about the nature of just what we are and what we observe.

    As to the were these things appear historically, I am aware that the money makes the technology available, and the loss of a war makes the spending necessary. But it just seems to me like on level of strategic ideas, not just technologies but programs of thought and order, the military is where these organizational structures come from. The example I have in mind was pointed out first, perhaps, by Max Weber when he wrote about how the fixed functions and positions within the military influenced the way things are in society, the militarization of society. Bureaucratization in the nineteenth century. This is obviously a limited analyis, which only really dates back to the emergence of industrialized capitalism, but my grasp of history before that too limited to know what kind of relation military society had to civil society, and to ideas in general.

    • kvond August 24, 2009 at 12:11 pm

      Yes Eric [been away from the comp.], the OODA is an interesing model, but I am much less compelled by the “loop” aspect (which I believe Boyd himself tried to de-emphasize), and more interested in the “Orientation” phase itself, in the so called loop. Very little has been written on this, except for Boyd’s thoughts on something like abduction. I hope to post on my thinking here soon.

      • Eric August 24, 2009 at 3:03 pm

        Somewhere, I saw a chart comparing the difference between orientation and decision in relation to consciousness, functionality, and evolution. It seemed to basically all follow from the fact that th ‘orientation’ stage is unconscious while the ‘decision’ stage is conscious. So, orientation is implicit, and automatic, rapid-fire. Decision is slower and thought out. Orientation is a default process while ‘decision’ is deliberate. Orientation is a response to a specificity, it is contextualized. Decision is abstracted, logical, rational. And orientation is non-linguistic in contrast to decision, which is a verbal process. Also, orientation is universal, operating outside of any one individuals memory, or skill set, while decision is particular and based on the individuals past experiences and conditioning. We are all born with the capicity for ‘orientation’ while decision is specific to our genus.

  10. Paul August 24, 2009 at 3:13 am

    Stengers’ Power and Invention:situating science’ does have a number of essays that are relevant to these concerns. ‘Time and Representation,’Complexity a fad,’ ‘The Reenchantment of the world.’
    I recently stumbled across a french website:
    that has many vids (some in English – such as the Rorty, Haraway, Stengers) – enuf for a lifetime.

  11. Eric August 24, 2009 at 10:28 am

    Thank you for the link, Paul. I enjoyed the Latour video ‘What is Organization?’.

    Anyway, I just started the book and it reminded me of another instance in which the preeminent site of thought re-organization was the military- Greek mathematics.

    Do the post-structuralists attempt to move beyond any rererence to a technology? Have D&G succesfully transcended any ‘device’ with the BWO?

    • kvond August 24, 2009 at 12:13 pm

      Eric: “Have D&G succesfully transcended any ‘device’ with the BWO?”

      Kvond: I think that the BWO is a human praxis framework. But in a sense the BWO combines with all technologies, cybernetically…

  12. Eric August 24, 2009 at 10:35 am

    BTW, sorry if my questions and comments are distracting anduninteresting. As Latour said at the end of his speech, I am just at the bottom of my learning curve.

    • kvond August 24, 2009 at 12:14 pm

      I like your questions and comments quite a bit. I go through periods when I’m not near the computer, and then when I am near it quite a bit.

  13. john doyle August 24, 2009 at 12:11 pm

    Evocative post and discussion. Do you guys know anything about Eyal Weizman’s Hollow Land? Weizman, an architect, analyzes the Israeli occupation of Palestine in Deleuzian terms. I’ve not read the book, but in an interview Weizman describes the Israeli army’s thorough deterritorialization of Palestinian space, tunneling into individual houses and apartment units just like in Brazil (the movie, not the country).

  14. Eric August 24, 2009 at 5:22 pm

    Historically, it seems that (one of) the reason(s) a military fails in war is because they’ve skipped orientation and remained isolated. In this way, they are constantly surprised by the enemy attacks. Your going to lose the ‘strategy game’ if you’re not interacting. So, really, the point of the orientation stage, strategically, is to understand the nature of the enemies system, which you cannot do from within. So the idea is to open yourself to their system, act faster than your enemy, and in so doing, fold your enemies up into themselves. So, really, the strategic point of the OODA loop is orientation, which shapes the way we observe and act. What makes this theory chaoplexic, as I undertand it, is that it takes you and the opponent to be adaptive networks.

    But, there is more inter-connectivity than the name ‘loop’ implies. And the process is based in more than just networks themselves, which was you original point. So it is very simplistic, to thnk of it as a completed loop, wich indeed undermines the conception of the edge-of-chaos, because if it is looped it is all order and no chaos. This is basically the extent of my knowledge on the OODA loop. But, yes, clearly the loop isn’t so strong of a thing altogether, orientation is the interesting idea.

    John Doyle, I have heard of the Israelian tunneling in Pakistan, but never by Deleuzian terms. That sounds like a frightening read.

  15. Eric August 24, 2009 at 5:25 pm

    Oops, should have put that lasy bit in response to the respective comment. Sorry, I keep on starting needlessly starting new threads instead of replying to the right ones.

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