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Ode to Man
Tho’ many are the terrors,
not one more terrible than man goes.
This one beyond the grizzled sea
in winter storming to the south
He crosses, all-engulfed,
cutting through, up from under swells.
& of the gods She the Eldest, Earth
un-withering, un-toiling, is worn down,
As the Twisting Plough’s year
into Twisting Plough’s year,
Through the breeding of horse, he turns.
& the lighthearted race of birds
all-snaring he drives them
& savage beasts, their clan, & of the sea,
marine in kind
With tightly-wound meshes spun
from all-seeing is Man.
Yet too, he masters by means of pastoral
beast, mountain-trodding,
The unruly-maned horse holding fast,
‘round the neck yoked,
& the mountain’s
ceaseless bull.
& the voice & wind-fast thought
& the passion for civic ways
He has taught, so from crag’s poor court
from under the ether’s hard-tossed arrows
To flee, this all-crossing one. Blocked, he comes
upon nothing so fated.
From Hades alone escape he’ll not bring.
Tho’ from sickness impossible
Flight he has pondered.
A skilled one, devising of arts beyond hope,
Holding at times an evil,
But then to the noble he crawls,
honoring the laws of the Earth, &
Of gods the oath so just,
high-citied.
Citiless is the one who with the un-beautiful
dwells, boldly in grace.
Never for me a hearth-mate
may he have been, never equal in mind
He who offers this.
Ode to Man
A BwO is made in such a way that it can be occupied, populated only by intensities. Only intensities pass and circulate. Still, the BwO is not a scene, a place, or even a support upon which something comes to pass. It has nothing to do with phantasy, there is nothing to interpret. The BwO causes intensities to pass; it produces and distributes them in a spatium that is itself intensive, lacking extension. It is not space, nor is it in space; it is matter that occupies space to a given degree—to the degree corresponding to
the intensities produced. It is nonstratified, unformed, intense matter, the matrix of intensity, intensity = 0; but there is nothing negative about that zero, there are no negative or opposite intensities. Matter equals energy. Production of the real as an intensive magnitude starting at zero. That is why we treat the BwO as the full egg before the extension of the organism and the organization of the organs, before the formation of the strata; as the intense egg defined by axes and vectors, gradients and thresholds, by dynamic tendencies involving energy transformation and kinematic movements involving group displacement, by migrations: all independent
of accessory forms because the organs appear and function here only as pure intensities. The organ changes when it crosses a threshold, when it
changes gradient. "No organ is constant as regards either function or position, . . . sex organs sprout anywhere,... rectums open, defecate and close, . . . the entire organism changes color and consistency in split-second adjustments." The tantric egg. After all, is not Spinoza's Ethics the great book of the BwO?
Ode to Man
But human power is extremely limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes; we have not, therefore, an absolute power of shaping to our use those things which are without us. Nevertheless, we shall bear with an equal mind all that happens to us in contravention to the claims of our own advantage, so long as we are conscious, that we have done our duty, and that the power which we possess is not sufficient to enable us to protect ourselves completely; remembering that we are a part of universal nature, and that we follow her order. If we have a clear and distinct understanding of this, that part of our nature which is defined by intelligence, in other words the better part of ourselves, will assuredly acquiesce in what befalls us, and in such acquiescence will endeavour to persist. For, in so far as we are intelligent beings, we cannot desire anything save that which is necessary, nor yield absolute acquiescence to anything, save to that which is true: wherefore, in so far as we have a right understanding of these things, the endeavour of the better part of ourselves is in harmony with the order of nature as a whole.
I very much appreciate your equation, I was just wondering what the forward slash in Frames/sing signifies so now I may have found some clues.
I’m compelled by Deleuze’s Distaff and your use of skein, which I came across somewhere, and also pulled into the deep waters of trying to measure convergences between 2/n with Nagarjuna’s tetralemma.
Also wondering if Dark Vitalism might promise a way out of the dead end of being/non being or true/not true binary engagement, wherein it becomes more appealing and acceptable to ride one’s subjectivity.
Amarilla,
Yes, I think that most philosophical moves toward “n” focus are attempts to not fall into the dead-ends of binary engagment, probably in the Europian West starting with Augustine’s wish to avoid the dualism of Manichism, and drawing on Plotinus’s degree of Being conception to do so. I like that thought of “riding one’s subjectivity”.
p.s. yes, I never really thought about the strict meaning of the forward slash, but you seem to have hit upon something. There is a certain homology going on here.
Forgot to mention, I enjoy the photosomatoglyph you include here as toothsome commentary on Aaron Koblin’s flight patterns.
Just wanted to poke my nose in here and ask a really dumb question: all of this discussion revolves around Schelling, right? You know, his ‘dark ground’ of being — God and the rotary motion of the drives — which, strictly speaking, is not. That’s the idea driving this discussion, no?
Alexei,
Yes, I suspect that this all really starts with Schelling in some regard, thought I entered into the thinking at Naught Thought who seems to have his own take on Dark Vitalism. Schelling of course was an Idealist (and oxomoronically, also a Spinozist). And as an Idealist qualifies under a “2” thinker, which at least in my very short book would mean not a Dark Vitalist.
Kevin,
It seems that the following fallacy is common in the tradition of German idealism: equating the ‘object’ with the set of all possible worlds, and then defining the ‘subject’ as a sort of impossible object, which is distinct from this set. From this point of view, the error is not in positing binaries, since nature instantiates all possible binaries, and I see nothing especially dubious, metaphysically speaking, about the idea of dualisms as such. Rather, as I see it, the error is in positing contradictions, such as ‘impossible object’, or ‘paraconsistent subject’. But maybe this can be avoided by treating the subject as just another contingent expression of the infinite and the finite. Would this also, however, remove some of the motivation for reducing epistemology to “material poeticism”?
James
Yes, dichtomization seems endemic to thinking itself, but implied in “binary” is the sense of “irreducible binary” wich can lead to what you mean by “contradition”. Moving away from essential opposition tends to put us in the world of taxonomies and processes. But I think it is more than this. It is fair to say that the concept of contradition drives much of “2” thinking, but there is also a kind of pictorial metaphor that capatures philosophies of the “2”. If we are to say Presence and Absence governs many philosophies, treating them as non-contradictions, but as part of Differance, as for instance Derrida does, does not take us out of the Philosophy of the 2. To the contray, one is still in a preoccupation still caught in the spell of the 2. It is for this reason that I find Heidegger’s thought also far too “2” driven.
I certainly like your resolution of the subject, but I don’t see how making the subject “another contingent expression of the infinite and the finite” reduces the material poeticism. This seems rather poetic and material in its own right (and I don’t find poetic materialism all that bad (thinking of Deleuze and G&D (Anodyne lite reminds me of my thought that the intials should be reversed).
Amarilla,
Thanks for the good comments on the photo choice.
Kevin,
An irreducible binary holds between two terms which have nothing in common. It is the sort of thing Spinoza had in mind at the beginning of the Ethics, and denying it forms part of his manner of generating ontological consistency. So that is one way of thinking about contradiction, as you say. Instead of thinking of the relation between the 1 and the 2, with Spinoza we get in between the 0 and the 1.
I would not say the concept of contradiction, so much as just contradictions per se, drive much of 2 thinking. I have never found the pictorial metaphor of Presence and Absence to be particularly precise or profound. Ditto for Heidegger and Derrida. Most philosophies which retain the mystical (Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is a little more to my tastes here) also retain irreducible binaries, and are thus incompatible with Spinozism.
I haven’t thought enough about material poeticism to know whether I like it or not, but I am at least not presently committed to “reducing” it, but only to de-totalizing it. As for your suggestion that my solution was itself poetic and material, this depends on how you characterize these terms. Obviously a single sentence description of my solution is going to be evocative and suggestive, and in that sense poetic. And if you mean “material” in an a priori sense, where it is equivalent to “being” or “something”, then clearly I have very little room to disagree with you. But I suspect you had something more substantive in mind here. In any case, note that I distinguish, I think more strongly than Spinoza does, between necessity and contingency. I offer two different epistemologies here, whereas he at least seems to offer only one. The first is an account of our knowledge of necessity, which is a modal monster built on a version of Descartes’ cogito. It is something like what Meillassoux is doing in his book. If I had to guess I’d say it doesn’t resemble what you would typically classify as material poeticism.
James
Wonderful comments. I very much appreciate them.
James,
It strikes me that you may be interested in this article because it touches on a subject I think we’ve discussed before, and the topic above…
http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/ap85/papers/TwoInfinity.html
Kevin,
Thanks for this. I wasn’t aware Pruss had done work on Spinoza. I take the problem of the attributes to be distinct from what interests me most in Spinoza’s system, and am a little more skeptical that it can be salvaged for contemporary use. But perhaps we can’t cut things up so neatly, and the issue remains interesting regardless.
James,
I strongly suspect that you have read this due to your past interest in Deleuze’s Difference and R. and your current interest in Spinoza, but why not forward the title:
http://books.google.com/books?id=nDWiim-oMwwC&dq=Simon+Duffy+Spinoza&source=gbs_navlinks_s