Frames /sing


Heidegger’s Confusion Over “Truth”

The Blanketing of the Truth

The problem is that Heidegger as he examines the Greek concept of truth (aletheia), even as it is investigated by Plato in The Sophist, begins with Aristotle. We can see this plainly in his recounting of the “history” of truth in his lectures on the Platonic Dialogue, as he moves as quickly as possible to the logos-determined, speaking realm of human beings. Heidegger wants to get onto the firm and comfortable ground of Dasein, of human-oriented Being-There. And in the quotation below we can see how in just a few strokes he gets from “Aletheia” (which is commonly translated into our word “truth”) to the albeit to be problemized “uncoveredness” of the legomenon, “the spoken thing”.

the history of the concept of truth

Alethes means literally “uncovered.” It is primarily things, the pragmata, that are uncovered. To pragmata alethes. This uncoveredness does not apply to things insofar as they are, but insofar as they are encountered, insofar as they are objects of concern. Accordingly uncoveredness is a specific accomplishment of Dasein, which has its being in the soul: aletheuei he psyche. Now the most immediate kind of uncovering is speaking about things. That is, the determination of life, a determination that can be conceived of as logos, primarily takes over the function of aletheuein. Aletheuei ho logos, and precisely logos [speech, reason] as logein [to speak]. Insofar now as each logos is a self-expression and a communication, logos requires at once the meaning of the logomenon [the spoken thing]. And insofar as it is logos which aletheuei, logos qua logomenon is alethes. But strictly taken this is not the case. Nevertheless, isfaras speaking is a pronouncement and in the proposition aquires a proper existence, so that knowledge is preserved therein, even the logos as logomenon can be called alethes….Knowing or considering is always a speaking, whether vocalized or not. All disclosive comportment, not only everyday finding one’s way about, but also scientific knowledge, is carried out in speech. Legein primarily takes over the function of aletheuein. This legein is for the Greeks the basic determination of man: Zoon logon echon [an animal that holds speech]. And thus Aristotle achieves [in Nic. Eth. VI, 2], precisely in connection with this determination of man, i.e. the field of the logon echon and with respect to it, the first articulation of the five modes of altheuein. (Heidegger’s lectures on Plato’s Sophist, 18-19)

There are a few things to set straight right off. His simple, literal defintion of aletheia as  “uncoveredness” is an incredible simplification of the meanings and origins of the word, something he quickly has reduced, in largely Sophoclean fashion, to a trope of cloaking and residual depth. The power and sweep of this simplification should not be underestimated, for it directs the whole of the theoretical that follows. When something is “covered” our immediate questions inevitably turn to the nature of the thing that lies between it and us, how did it get there, what is it made of, can we remove it, what purpose does it serve. One can see how nicely such a condensed translation fits within the Idealist tradition which focuses on the Phenomenal and Ideational veil of Ideas.

Unfortunately, or we might say fortunately, the history of the concept of truth goes back much further than where Heidegger wants to take it. He wants us to see that A-letheia is a privative. It means A (not) letheia (covered). But does -letheia mean “covered”? Not really; at least it cannot be reduced to such without extensive distortion. We can recognize the name famous River of Lethe in the land of the Dead (so named by Ovid) in the word, a history of which we will return to in a moment. But the root comes from the Greek verb lanthánõ, which specifically means (LSJ):

A. in most of the act. tenses, to escape notice

B. causal, to make one forget a thing

As a signular note, a cloaked thing might or might not escape notice, and one might or might not forget a cloaked thing (in either case its very cloakedness could draw attention to it, as someone who kept their hand hidden behind their back has a certain obviousness to them). The Greek concept of Lethe is much more thorough than “cloakedness.” It is much closer to our notion of Oblivion. The forgetfulness of Lethe is more than the visual trope of “coveredness” gives us. It is the dissipation of difference. There is no difference there that matters, that makes a difference.

To bring out more of this concept of Aletheia, the a- (un) letheia (forgotten, obliteratered, lost) I want to turn to the Orphic mythologies that informed Plato’s own theories of truth, and likely formed a widespread and constitutive influence upon the very notion of aletheia in Greek culture. Below I quote from Guthries’s Classic text,  Orpheus and the Greek Religion, a selection which focuses on the occult knowledge of the Underworld given an Orphic Initiate regarding the topography of the land of the Dead, and their explicit instructions on how to avoid Lethe.

Keeping, then, to the right, the soul comes to a spring [on the right, having been warned not to drink from the spring of forgetfulness on the left], and addresses to the guardians that are before it a prayer that it may be allowed to drink of the water, of which it is in dire need: “I am parched with thirst and I perish”. We may presume that it has passed by the way that is described in the Republic as leading to the plain of Lethe, “through terrible and suffocating heat; for it is bare of trees and of all the fruits of the earth”. At the end of that journey too the souls are given water to drink. For the general belief that the dead are thirsty and in urgent need of water we have references which though not frequent are sufficient to indicate that it must have been widely held and not a particular tenet of the Orphics. The same prayer occurs in the Egyptian Book of the Dead, and had been adopted from it into the Hellenic religion of the same part of the world, as is shown by several sepulchral inscriptions, found, like the gold plates themselves, in Italy, with the formula: “May Osiris give thee the cold water”. No doubt the name of Osiris was taken by the Greeks because they found in the Egyptian religions an idea similar to that which they already held themselves.

The word yuxpro/n means of course not simply “cold” but “refreshing”. (The two are the same in Mediterranean countries.) It is of the same root as psyche, soul and Dieterich (Nekyia, 95) compares the word a)nayu=xai in the Orphic line which literally means “refreshed from evil”. The water is not ordinary water. It is water from the lake of Memory, and it is only the soul whose purity is vouched for which is to be allowed to drink from it. This is the soul which has escaped from the circle of birth, or evil, or woe, and is about to enter on the state of perfect divinity. Consequently it is not, like the souls in the Republic which are being prepared for a new incarnation, made to drink a certain measure of the water of Forgetfulness (Rep. 620a). That, without doubt, is the fountain on the left which it is told above all things to avoid. For it is reserved the water of life, which will enable it to retain full consciousness (Guthrie, Orpheus and the Greek Religion, 177)

How far we are from simple “covered” and “uncoveredness”, and even linguistic reductions of the determination of the human soul to that which is spoken. Rather, the depiction of Lethe and not-Lethe is expressed in very physical terms, in terms of refreshingly cold water as drink. The soul in the land of the dead has passed through extreme heat, and is bewildered by its thirst. It has been instructed not to drink of the fountain on the left, but on the right. Here I quote the already cited Orphic passage from the Republic:

[621a] And after it had passed through that, when the others also had passed, they all journeyed to the Plain of Oblivion [tes Lethes pedion], through a terrible and stifling heat, for it was bare of trees and all plants, and there they camped at eventide by the River of Forgetfulness [Ameleta potamon], whose waters no vessel can contain. They were all required to drink a measure of the water, and those who were not saved by their good sense drank more than the measure, and each one as he drank forgot all things.

The word-choice here is telling. The soul has passed across the Plain of Oblivion (tes Lethes pedion), and the river that the reincarnating soul drinks from is not the River of Lethe, but the River of Ameleta, the River of Uncaring. Under Orphic telling, the aletheia is not the “uncovered” but “the not-uncaring”. Clearly, those that drink from the River of Mnemosyne instead of Ameleta, retain their cares and concerns. Quite to the contrary of Heidegger’s lexical reversion which will eventually make a “cloaking” out of human Dasein engagment with the pragmata (affairs, things of concern), the very nature of aletheia is that of retaining concerns and care. It is only through the retention of cares that the soul is refreshed of the heat of oblivion.

The Role of Care as Revelation

Importantly, Heidegger tells us in his history of the concept of the truth that “This uncoveredness [of aletheia] does not apply to things insofar as they are, but insofar as they are encountered, insofar as they are objects of concern.” Notice how this differs from the Orphic/Platonic tale of elementary care and concern. The concern is not with “objects” but with thirst itself, with the state of one’s own body. It is the purity of this sufferance, as a care, which in turn orients the soul both toward the gaurdian and the spring. And contrary to Heidegger’s assessment, it is indeed the care of the soul which orients it rightfully to the pragmata, “insofar as they are”. One must, in examining the history of the Greek notion of the truth acknowledge this fundamental equation.

It is for this reason that the optical metaphor of covered and uncovered that Heidegger adopts, while suited to the Idealist heritage he keeps, actually is insufficient to the Greek concept of truth (insofar as we can historically generalize). The the failure of cares in Oblivion is the detachment from one’s own state, to dissipate. It is not a condition of veiling, or coveredness, of something coming between the subject and the world, but rather is a constitutive internal relation, a failure of orientation towards one’s own health and dynamic expression, a failure to recall in one’s concerns the connections which “as they are” have constituted you.

In this correction we must keep track of Heidegger’s smooth move towards Aletheia of speaking being: “Now the most immediate kind of uncovering is speaking about things.” One wants to stretch back to some time more distant than the benchmark for truth, Aristotle, and turn to Homer, the Iliad. Achilles is furious and in attendance of the Assembly where he is told that Agamemnon will take from him his beloved Briseis. Achilles has his hand on the hilt of his sword which he is in the act of drawing. Agamemnon is finished, yet:

The white-armed goddess Hera had sent her forth, [195] for in her heart she loved and cared for both men alike. She stood behind him, and seized the son of Peleus by his fair hair, appearing to him alone. No one of the others saw her. Achilles was seized with wonder, and turned around, and immediately recognized Pallas Athene. Terribly her eyes shone. (Book One, lines 195-200)

What is the “truth” status of Athena’s terribly flashing eyes? None of the others in the hall saw her (literally, she was coming to light [phanomene] to him alone, not the others).  Not only did he perceive her [gignosko] as generally present, but seemed to do so as particularized by the very manifestion of her eyes [phaanthen]. These eyes are the very epithetic status of the goddess herself, “Flash-eyed” Athena. I suggest really that it is not on this occasion of words (debate in a hall) that the most immediate form of “uncovering” is words, but rather of bodily seizure and distinctive identification. The pragmata of Achilles’ concern, that of Agamemnon’s unworthy stewardship of the Greek contingent, his love for Briseis, suddenly is invaded by the pragmata of his own condition, exposed in the glinting revelation of things as they are, the concerns of his very thumatic soul. But it is not a condition of layering, of things standing between what is and the perceiver. Nothing is hidden, rather the richness of connection is accomplished in care. We find this in the poem when Achilles finally achieves the ῎Ελεος of compassion for Hector’s father and his sworn enemy King Priam, Eleos, the God of Mercy. This is what is missing from Heidegger’s notion of “truth” as kinds of covering and uncovering, in an optical metaphor of distance.

Productively I feel that the order of these points against Heidegger should be framed within a large problem in the Idealist tradition that Heidegger participates in, and this is the absolute tendency to consider philosophical questions solely in terms of a fundamental dyad. This form of analysis is one that principally comes out of the European Christian concern of how to connect the human soul with God. The presumption was that the world simply interferred in some sense (which the exception of the Church, which faciliated the connection) As God came to be displaced, the fundamental question became epistemic, how does the human perceiving subject connect to the world (and the world’s surrogate, the “object”). In taking the philosophical question to be primarily a subject/object question, the great and constitutive third, others, came to be pushed aside. In general, as philosophies become discordantly engaged with one-to-one relationships, and their profusion of binaries, it is inherently insuffient and misguided (that is, it has decomplexified the relationships of the world to an unhelpful degree). It seems to me that as Heidegger turned to Aristotlean notions of truth, categorizing them widely as Greek, and adopted a primarly optical metaphor for qualifications of Being, he did so in a way quite friendly to the pre-existing Idealist dyad of self/world. In this fashion, in his foreclosure to the immanent capacities of “care” in the Greek mind, he obscured the very third leg of the triangle, others, which would otherwise show how “care” in all things, including things “non-human” is actively involved in our mutual construction of the world, in degrees of ontological freedom.  Because “aletheia” was for Idealist Heidegger primarily an EYE/OBJECT relation (that metaphor), the constitutive movment from “lethe” (dissipative oblivion) to “a-leth-eia” (condensed internal relations of expressive care) was robbed of the very depth of the dimensionality of others. More Augustine, more Achilles was needed.


7 responses to “Heidegger’s Confusion Over “Truth”

  1. Mark Crosby March 2, 2009 at 9:11 pm

    Hi Kvond, I’ll probably be missing the point here (since I was unable to digest ALL of this essay 😉 but I was struck by this comment near the end: “In this fashion, in his foreclosure to the immanent capacities of ‘care’ in the Greek mind, [Heidegger] obscured the very third leg of the triangle, others, which would otherwise show how ‘care’ in all things, including things ‘non-human’ is actively involved in our mutual construction of the world, in degrees of ontological freedom”.

    I wonder if there’s a way for a “cold vitalism” to conceive this care, or whether all ethics would ultimately dissolve into esthetics? (reading your stimulating post on Lebanese prison theater in another tab 😉

    Anyway, given your trichotomic inclinations, I’ve been eager to see you write something related to Peirce. Perhaps even more than Sloterdijk, Peirce seems ignored by Speculative Realists. As an offering I’ll suggest the following:

    At the level of objects, we are seduced (Baudrillard’s “The Object and Its Destiny”, in FATAL STRATEGIES 😉 while at the level of social circles we are ethically affected; but, beyond this, the cold, blanketing snow of formal reasons beckons, or it slips steathily through a crack in the door (with “the polyvalence of an incestruous semiotic power” 😉

    Here we might work on what CS Peirce called “Reasoning in Security and Uberty” or his epistle of “Evolutionary Love” which recognized “three kinds of evolution (by fortuitous variation, by mechanical necessity, and by creative love)”. I think I like the Spinozist prophet Bernard Mandeville better than Peirce does, even as he recognizes that “the deeper workings of the spirit take place in their own slow way, without our connivance”. Peirce, ever a lover of neologisms, names these three modes: tychasm, anancasm, and agapasm. For an example of what agapastic expression can achieve, Peirce points to the Gothic cathedrals built by free masons.

    Peace… Mark

  2. kvond March 2, 2009 at 9:35 pm

    Mark, thanks for all your comments.

    I don’t have strong connections to Peirce as the direction his Realism tugs has less appeal, but I do see where you find the possible connection.

    As far as cold vitalism having triangulating hopes I do see this, and wrote about it in this essay connecting Deleuze and Guattari to Davidson in the example of transgender:

    Davidson’s Triangulations of knowledges and Principle of Charity is where I get my notion of triangular improvements on traditional Dyads. In both principles I found strong correspondences in Spinoza’s writing. The idea that we must attribute some notion of “same” not only to human beings but also to all objects, to even make sense of the world has firm ethical consequences.

    I can also see aesthetic considerations being ranked high if we speak of the aesthetic principles of Aristotle, in particular as they were incorporated by Process Theology (a brief summation: But aesthetics that are determinatively Ideal in conception, those that seek to reconcile the subject to the object in some form or fashion (even by turning the subject into an object), are by their very nature lost to the dimensionality of triangulation, the way in which objects reveal the world to use, and our place in it.

    Perhaps this fourth part of an essay which speaks specifically to Nicolas de Cusa’s experiences of looking at a painting may be of interest:

    Thanks for your thoughts again.

    p.s. I don’t know Mandeville, but sounds interesting.

  3. Mark Crosby March 2, 2009 at 10:20 pm

    OK, forget Peirce. I’m still trying to finish the Pascal Engel article you provided. I found it very helpful for understanding that Spinoza is not suggesting a mind/body dualism: “Spinoza holds that there is a distinction between the two attributes, thought and extension, of the unique substance, God… But this distinction is NOT a real distinction,. It is a formal one. Each attribute, thought and extension is distinct, because it has a formal reason which is distinct… To the formal distinction between attributes corresponds no division in being”.

    As for the Spinozism of Dr. Bernard Mandeville, England’s first psychiatrist, see Wim Klever’s article, “Bernard Mandeville and His Spinozist Appraisal of Vices” at

    Keep up the good work! Mark

  4. kvond March 2, 2009 at 10:27 pm

    Thanks so much for the Mandeville reference. I do love Wim Klever’s brilliant capacity to make connections no one else would venture. I look forward to it.

    I’m glad you are liking the Engel article. It was only a draft, and he apparently never finished it, but it is one of the best expositions of Spinoza’s fundamental point that I have read.

  5. Mathias May 28, 2009 at 8:00 pm

    I found this post while searching for material pertaining to Heidegger and Orphism, particularly, the question of aletheia and the Petelia tablets (the Guthrie quote). While I appreciate your treatment of this material, esp. the close comparison of Plato, Orphic and Egyptian rite when it comes to ‘refreshing waters,’ as a critique of Heidegger’s notion of truth I think the the essay fails in its objective and needs to be rethought. It limits itself to Plato’s Sophist, where H is at his Aristotelian/Platonic best/worst, but doesn’t explore the notions of aletheia as developed in esp. the 1930’s and early 1940’s. In Parmenides lecture, for instance, Heidegger discusses passages from Plato concerning Lethe, and his reading of Holderlin involves extensive river imagery as bound up with the origin of language, poetry, as well as material concerning liquid refreshment (in this case wine, but in others water) as concealing/revealing “quickly pass me the dark cup full of fragrant light” etc. . . Heidegger’s notion of truth as aletheia cannot be gleaned from a single source, or in relation to prematurely limited number of texts, sites, or tropes, but requires synthetic appreciation of diverse texts, followed by careful attentiveness to controversies and revisions, and ending in an overall view. Seeing Heidegger on aletheia as an oeuvre (often rooted in Greek texts, often retracted, and often deriving only from Heidegger), I’d say that your engaging points re. Orphic truth offer more of a possibility for rapprochement or even vindication or extension of Heidegger on aletheia rather than negative critique. At least that’s the essay I’m presently writing, and thus heartened to find someone interested in this nexus! 🙂

    • kvond May 29, 2009 at 7:58 am

      Thanks for your thoughts, if only this blogpost’s “objective” were to save Heidegger from himself. Unfortunately I do not share the charitable view of Heidegger’s aims, nor foundational influences, or conclusions, and this post merely was spun out of thoughts come from discussions long past. I’m glad though that you found it at least thought provoking.

      Certainly Heidegger shifted away from certain emphasis of orginary conception, in particular in his Holderlin turn, but as you say,

      “…as well as material concerning liquid refreshment (in this case wine, but in others water) as concealing/revealing “quickly pass me the dark cup full of fragrant light”

      He is still in the grip of the Central Clarity Consciousness, optical conception of “the question”, stemmed from a Cartesian root, via Husserl, (a root which I outline here: ). The ultimate connection to Heidegger spelled out here in a contrast to Spinoza:

      He simply does not transcend this genealogy of thought, and is on the wrong side of the tracks, so to speak. So while you are right, one cannot analyze an entire arc of thought from one source, I do think that one can in one early source identify determinative conceptual structures that are never left behind. I think that this frame-work can be seen in Graham Harman’s Object-Oriented interpretation of Heidegger as well, which I have spent much time on this blog criticizing (not the interpretation, but rather the entire Heideggerian position).

      As long as Heidegger is talking about the hidden and revealed as an essential quality value, in fine Sophoclean fashion, he, in my view, is lost.

      Now it may very well be that one can save Heidegger from Heidegger, purge from him as much as one can the “bad” Platonism so to speak, but again, I really have no desire to save him at all. In a sense, with the cloth has such a weft, its much better to throw out the cloth and start from philosophers of a different weave.

      I don’t know if there has been a philosopher in all of history that so many people have tried to drag out of the waters and save, in so many ways. But as a thinker I certain can appreciate the desire for your trinity of “rapproachment, vindication or extension”. It is this kind of soteral drive that makes up much of the interesting work of philosopher. Heidegger for me simply is not that interesting.

  6. Pingback: Deep Interpretations: An Appreciation « Quiet Sun

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