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The Difference Without a Difference…What?

Spinoza to the Rescue

Reid over at Planomenology made a very interesting series of points on Larval Subject’s “difference that makes a difference” take on Graham Harman’s Object-Oriented Philosophy, points which read in a direction that at first blush seems to come from a different tack than the one that I employ. Reid finds as key to finding an ontology of things which may not make a difference is looking for the non-difference that does not make a difference. A creative approach.

Yet there is a third reading of the ontic principle that could undermine the apparent consistency of the Deleuzian approach, and I believe it is a reading that would fit Harman’s own variant of object-orientation. If there does not exist a difference that does not make a difference, that nonetheless means that there could exist a non-difference that does not make a difference. Levi’s ontic principle says nothing about the non-existence of non-differences.

It was only a passing thought at the time, but Reid’s non-difference making non-difference richly struck me as exemplifed in the formal relationship between Attributes in Spinoza. That is, there is a fundamental non-difference between them that allows them to reveal differences, and make the mind work. Reid gave a positive reaction to this line of thinking, so I thought that I should post the comment here as well.

As it turns out,  I had to appeal to Spinozist distinctions in my last response to Graham Harman so as to get a positive notion of the my lay of the ontological land, and perhaps by providence it seems that my associative thoughts on Reid’s thinking about difference may have more legs than first imagined. For in the end, what I argue to Graham, is that the depth of his Heideggerian objects is better served as the depth of Spinoza’s Substance, which is all the deper (and a degree of Being conception of Being). This may very well have grounds in the non-differential point that Reid was making. What is interesting is that Reid uses this distinction to undermine Deleuze who is in some sense operating under Spinozist influence.

My comment on non-difference:

The non-difference which makes no difference would be the order and connection of things and ideas as they are expressed in parallel Attributes (actually an infinity of Attributes)as found at the Ethics 2p7. The differences between Attributes are the same in terms of order and connection (thus a non-difference which makes no transitive transitive). Across Attributes non-difference pertains.

The difference that makes a difference is simply the horizontal modal and transitive causation, wherein differences between modes cause the differences between other modes. Each modal difference is “seen” by other modes (Berkely’s esse est percepi).

But, the non-difference which makes no difference, actually does make a difference (but not in the transitive sense of modal expression), but in terms of suturing the very immanence of the Mind’s ability to read the essence of Substance. That is, because the order and connection between things and ideas is the same (undifferentiated unto each other), the mind through the expression of the Attribute of Thought can establish the relative differences between modes. It can read along a vector of same and change. Relational defitions of objects are given a kind of depth. This does not mean that the objects themselves, (merely the expression of Substance in the Attribute of Extension), harbor or hide some “in-itself” (internalized relation) buried in its heart, but only that the immanent-same (non-difference)across Attributes makes possible the grasp of objecthood.

One might be tempted to say that the “order and connection” itself is already a differentiation, from one thing to another, one thought to another, but sub specie aeternitas, it can just be considered one great fixed articulation.

As mentioned in my last comments to Graham, it may be this depth that saves one from the undifferentiated slag of a DeLandian universe, a depth leveraged upon a non-difference which makes no (transitive) difference, the force of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), and Being as the capacity to act.

Perhaps of interest is a brief discussion I had with David Chalmers in which I attempted to introduce him to the notion that Spinoza presented a “zombie world” as our world (and not just a the logical possibility of it), and that Spinoza held a position that had great affinity to Chalmer’s idea of a protopanpsychism. Because Chalmers did not come from a typical philosophical pedagogy he was admittedly less than familiar with Spinoza, but considered the issue.

Loosely related to this: The Reality of the Affects: Spinoza’s Plotinian Real and Some Experiments in Re-translation, “idea” as “information”

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